I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the Twentieth Century, legislatures at all levels of American government have sought admirably to protect workers from a host of economic and societal ills by enacting broad-based remedial legislation. At times, these same legislatures have abdicated responsibility to the executive bureaucracy for further regulatory development. Without ensuring the attendant transfer of political accountability commensurate with the authority of the regulatory state, the delicate balance of powers crafted by the founders becomes skewed. Armed with the combined might of legislative fiat and unfettered enforcement power, the heavy hand of an over-zealous executive bureaucracy extends itself beyond the bounds initially established by the legislature in what is known as "mission creep." And, in the modern economy, the ramifications of mission creep are global.
Foreign businesses seeking to explore American markets through small American enterprises must remain wary of being caught in the morass of statutory and regulatory dictates that pervade American labor and employment legislation. As with their American counterparts, many of these small foreign businesses have neither the sophistication to understand the complexities of the American regulatory state nor the abundant resources necessary for compliance. Compounded by capricious statutory interpretations, their willingness to "invest in America" is diminished with the knowledge that they may be required to appease the regulatory community-and the Equal 12. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). 13. "The term 'employee' means an individual employed by any employer . . . . [including] any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country." 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (narrow exception for state or political subdivision omitted).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). As originally enacted, the ADEA protected only employees between the ages of forty and seventy years. However, a 1986 amendment struck the provision relating to the upper age limit. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § § 2(c), 6(a), 100 Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1)).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) ("The prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer.").
16. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1998).
The ADEA's jurisdictional constraints are accomplished through two limitations-one definitional and the other substantive. The statute defines an "employer" as a "person 9 engaged in an industry affecting commerce 10 who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty 11 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . ." 12 Further, while "employee" is defined quite broadly to include virtually all workers, 13 the ADEA only protects those employees over forty years of age.
14 Finally, and more substantive than definitional, the ADEA's reach is also limited by geography, citizenship, and the realities of corporate governance by excluding coverage "where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer."
15
Faced with deciding whether a small, seven-employee New York City "branch" office of a foreign business could meet the jurisdictional minimums required of the ADEA by counting the foreign business's foreign workers, the Morelli court made two important holdings: (i) that domestic operations of a foreign corporation not controlled by an American corporation would be subject to liability under the ADEA; and (ii) that foreign workers are to be counted towards reaching the statutory minimum when a domestic employer has fewer than twenty domestic employees. 16 By reversing the district court and finding that "a foreign corporation's foreign employees are counted for the purpose of determining whether the corporation has enough employees to 17 . Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY: REPORT TO EMPLOYMENT ACT 11 (1989) . be subject to the ADEA," 17 the Second Circuit extended the dictates of the ADEA (and, consequently, the EEOC's investigative authority) upon foreign controlled businesses despite the text of the ADEA and Congress's contrary intent.
The focus of this exposition is the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' flawed reasoning in Morelli v. Cedel. But rather than merely present a case note, Morelli is intended to serve as a vehicle for a critique of the judiciary's penchant in the employment arena for supplanting its will for that of Congress and the consequent mission creep expected of the regulatory community. Joseph Story once stated, "'whatever may have been the private intentions of the framers . . . , it is certain, that the true rule of interpretation is to ascertain the public and just intention from the language of the instrument itself, according to the common rules applied to all laws. '" 18 Part II of this Article discusses the legislative foundations of the ADEA, including its unremarkable history and known limitations, its narrow extraterritorial expansion, and the unintended birth of its internationality. In Part III, we discuss Morelli v. Cedel, its facts, how the district court correctly decided the matter, and how the Second Circuit veered off course. In Part IV, we provide the anatomy of how the Second Circuit outflanked Congress towards the internationality of the ADEA. We then conclude, in Part V, by identifying the negative geopolitical and economic consequences of judicial usurpation of congressional authority.
II. LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ADEA

A. A False Start and a Humble Beginning
The ADEA did not burst upon the employment scene in 1967 without warning or contemplation. Rather, the possibility of prohibiting age discrimination in employment surfaced in the debates over the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). The opponents of Title VII sought inclusion of an age provision in the broader bans on sex, race, and national origin discrimination that Congress eventually enacted. 19 24. Id. 25. Id. As O'Meara discusses, one study, upon which the report relied, "showed that approximately one-half of all job openings which developed in the private economy each year were closed to applicants over fifty-five . . . and a quarter of these job openings were closed to applicants over forty-five." Id. ( Southerners, the bill's opponents had hoped that Title VII would become "so broad and 'unreasonable' as to keep it from passing."
20
Seeking to forestall the opposition, Title VII's proponents asserted that not enough was known about the problems of age discrimination to effectively legislate a remedy, 21 and succeeded in adding a provision directing the Secretary of Labor to engage in a study of the problems of workplace age discrimination.
22
Delivered to Congress in 1965, the Secretary's report, entitled The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment, concluded that the problem of age discrimination was not prejudice but rather incorrect stereotypes in hiring. 23 A particular focus was the practice of employers setting age limits beyond which candidates would no longer be considered for open positions.
24
Such practices, the report found, led to long-term unemployment of older workers. 25 The Secretary of Labor's recommendation: "A clear cut and implemented Federal policy . . . [that] would provide a foundation for a much-needed vigorous, nationwide campaign to promote hiring without discrimination on the basis of age."
26 Supporters of civil rights reform achieved a perfect victory. Not only had they won the passage of Title VII, but they also succeeded in making age discrimination in the workplace a matter of national concern.
In 1966, after another stunted attempt to place an age discrimination provision in other labor legislation, 27 Congress ordered the Secretary of Labor to submit specific legislative recommendations to combat the ills identified in the report the previous year. Considering the bill's record and the original intention to use anti-age discrimination provisions as an impediment to the passage of Title VII, 33 it is rather surprising that opposition to the ADEA was insignificant. 34 No one in the Senate opposed the bill, 35 and only eleven Congressmen in the House of Representatives stood in opposition-all because they believed its protections were not strong enough.
36
The dearth of debate and wrangling led one commentator to quip: "The legislative history is exceedingly bland." 44. FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 13. The long-term effect of the ADEA has borne this out. One commentator has noted that "the problem at which Congress directed the ADEA, age discrimination in hiring and long-term unemployment among older workers, is no better and no worse than it was when the ADEA was passed in 1967." O'MEARA, supra note 19, at 2. Census data, compiled and published in support of a recent report by the AARP, a not-for-profit membership organization for people fifty years of age and older clearly strengthens this conclusion. See AARP, BEYOND 50: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON ECONOMIC SECURITY (2001), available at http://www.research.aarp.org/econ/beyond_50_econ.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004). In 1980, only 41% of the population over the age of fifty participated in the workforce. Twenty years later, in spite of all the advancements in healthcare, education, and antidiscrimination laws that number had increased to just 44%. In fact, after 1980 the number of older workers participating in the labor force actually dropped as low as 38%. It was not until 1996 that the numbers again surpassed the mark set in 1980. See AARP, BEYOND 50: SUMMARY TABLES AND CHARTS (2001), scholar to conclude that "Congress was totally unaware of the impact the ADEA would ultimately have."
39
B. The ADEA Knows Its Limits
As is set forth in the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, the ADEA is intended "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 40 Vague as these phrases are, the broad statement of legislative purpose might provide the best explanation of the scope of the law's intended prohibitions.
In enacting the ADEA, Congress expressed its will to prohibit certain companies from discriminating against certain individuals.
41
Although described as "remedial and humanitarian," 42 the ADEA was drafted with many significant limitations; not all "older" workers were protected and not all employing entities were covered "employers."
At the outset, the ADEA only protected workers between the ages of forty and sixty-five. 43 Indeed, the ADEA had been described as protective not for the elderly, but for the middle-aged. 44 2000)).
49. Section 11(h) of the ADEA defined the term "industry affecting commerce" to mean "any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and includes any activity or industry 'affecting commerce' within the meaning of 52. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the floor debate of Title VII and suggesting that the minimum employee requirement was intended to protect small businesses from the burdens of compliance and the costs of litigation associated with discrimination suits).
53. We do not intend to suggest that small business should feel free to discriminate in a manner seventy in 1978, 45 and eventually removed the upper bound age limit completely for the majority of workers. 46 Mandatory retirement, however, is still permissible for "bona fide executives or high policymakers" older than sixty-five, so long as certain pension requirements are met. 47 Similarly, an ADEA covered "employer" was originally limited to "a person 48 engaged in an industry affecting commerce 49 who has twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . ." 50 The term "employee" was merely defined, albeit circularly, as "an individual employed by any employer."
51 By adopting these limiting definitions of the terms "employer" and "employee," Congress had not only sought to cloak the ADEA in the constitutionality of the Commerce Clause, but had also sought to insulate smaller domestic businesses from the expense 52 It can be argued that the ADEA should be amended to provide extraterritorial coverage to Americans working in foreign countries for American companies. This is underscored by [T]itle VII's extraterritorial application and the long-recognized fact that the purposes and goals of the two statutes are parallel, that is, to eliminate discrimination in employment. The only way to make the two laws consistent and insure that other individuals do not find themselves in Mr. Cleary's situation in the future is to enact legislation such as that proposed by Chairman Grassley to close the existing loophole.
63
Congress subsequently amended the ADEA in 1984 to extend its coverage to U.S. citizens employed in foreign countries by U.S. entities or their subsidiaries. 64 This amendment modified the definition of "employee" to include "any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country." 65 It also added an entire subsection under the section entitled "Prohibition of age discrimination." 
67
Congress believed that these amendments were "carefully worded to apply only to citizens of the United States who are working for U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries[, and that it would] not apply to foreign nationals working for such corporations in a foreign workplace and it [would] not apply to foreign companies which are not controlled by U.S. firms." 68 Accordingly, determining whether an employing entity (i.e., a "person" as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 630(a)) is an "employer" covered by the ADEA is simple enough when the entity at issue is a domestic enterprise that employs twenty or more employees in the United States. 69 The 1984 amendments ensure that the same determination is made when the employing entity has fewer than twenty employees working in the United States but also employs a larger complement of U.S. citizens on foreign soil either directly or through a subsidiary. 70 By virtue of the 1984 amendments, the ADEA clearly applies to these U.S. citizens working for U.S. employers or their subsidiaries on foreign soil.
71
The result is not so clear, however, when attempting to determine whether the ADEA covers an employing entity that has fewer than twenty employees working in the United States but that is owned or otherwise controlled by a foreign entity that employs a larger complement of foreign individuals working on foreign soil. The text of the ADEA does not expressly and unambiguously declare whether such employing entities are subject to the ADEA under this narrow circumstance. The colloquy between Senator Grassley and Clarence Thomas at the Senate Subcommittee's hearing on these amendments 72 is prophetic of the dilemma at hand: Twenty years have since passed, and during that time the interconnectedness of the global marketplace has increased exponentially with the end of the Cold War and the advent of technologies such as the Internet. In 1991, at least 2,000 U.S. companies operated 21,000 overseas offices in 121 countries.
74
By 1998, an estimated 300,000 Americans worked abroad.
75
More importantly, for purposes of the interstice in ADEA coverage being explored here, foreign firms began looking to operate or otherwise invest in businesses on American soil. 76 Local political leaders in the nation's rust belt frequently travel to other countries in efforts to attract foreign investments to "create" jobs and increase the local tax base. 77 Accordingly, an increasingly global economy continues to put the text of the ADEA, and, indeed, congressional will, to the test. Some commentators suggest that the American economy was largely selfcontained when Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967-that is, foreign companies rarely operated in the United States and American companies rarely operated abroad. 78 Assuming this is true, it is no wonder that the text of the ADEA did not expressly address whether international workers were to be counted with U.S. workers for purposes of determining coverage. Subsequent amendments to the ADEA have done some to clarify this murky issue, yet, as the Second Circuit's decision in Morelli v. Cedel makes evident, definitive resolution remains either elusive or flawed.
III. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ADEA IN MORELLI V. CEDEL
Before Morelli, all federal courts that addressed the issue uniformly held that only domestic employees of a foreign employer were to be counted for purposes of satisfying the ADEA and Title VII statutory minimums. 79 Even within the Second Circuit, the weight of authority "held that the foreign employees of a foreign corporation [did] of New York specifically rejected the counting of foreign workers to reach the statutory minimum under Title VII. 84 The Rao court determined that while the definition of employee does not specify that only those workers found within the United States are counted under the statute, Title VII does specifically reject its application "'with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an American Employer.'" 85 In extending limited extraterritorial application of the ADEA, these courts relied upon the foreign employer exemption expressly set forth in the ADEA, which states: "The prohibitions of [the ADEA] shall not apply where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an American Employer."
86 If the foreign operations of a foreign corporation is not considered an employer, the "foreign employees of a foreign corporation are not considered employees . . . ."
87
A. An Unremarkable Case
Bland facts rarely garner much attention for a case and the facts of Morelli are as straightforward and unexceptional as they come. In a time when discrimination cases can make headlines for either magnitude or salaciousness, this case has neither. On its facts, the case is simply a basic workplace discrimination charge. Maybe it should be little shock that from a case warranting so little notice comes an opinion with such implications. 88 Ida Morelli was employed in the New York branch office of defendant Cedel Bank, S.A. 89 Cedel, an international securities trading company, 90 maintained its principal place of business and the majority of its employees in Luxembourg. 91 In addition to its main office, the firm operated satellite After its investigation, the NYDHR found no probable cause to believe Cedel had engaged in discriminatory action and issued a determination order dismissing the complaint. 100 Having complied with the administrative prerequisites, Morelli exercised her right to file suit in federal court and brought suit under the NYHRA, ADEA, and ERISA. 101 Cedel moved for dismissal of the ADEA claim on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that it employed only eleven workers in its New York office. 102 Cedel argued that it did not meet the ADEA's 103. Id. Circuits are split on the question of whether the employee statutory minimum is a jurisdictional prerequisite appropriate for a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) dismissal or a question of fact appropriate for summary judgment. See, e.g., Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding for federal subject matter jurisdiction to exist under ADEA, defendant must meet Act's definition of "employer," i.e., defendant must employ twenty or more individuals); EEOC v. St 
108
In Goyette, the same district court had found that Dentsu, Inc., Defendant DCA's foreign corporate parent based in Japan, could be held liable for its subsidiary's Title VII violations even though the parent did not employ the statutory minimum of fifteen employees required by Title VII. 109 The Goyette court reasoned that although Denstu did not have any domestic employees under a common law interpretation of the word, "that fact [ The Morelli district court acknowledged that although similarities between Title VII and the ADEA 112 sometimes permit analogizing the interpretations of one statute to aid the interpretations of the other, Goyette was not on point. 113 The key distinction, the district court noted, was that the Goyette court did not count the foreign employees, 114 as Morelli requested here. 115 The court further pointed out that the "plaintiff cites no Title VII or ADEA case where a court considered foreign employees outside the United States to find that the employer met the statutory minimum."
116
The Morelli district court ultimately held that it is entirely inappropriate to count foreign workers employed overseas-not only are they not "employees" protected under the statute, but also the ADEA does not apply to foreign operations of foreign companies. 117 The court reasoned that while the last sentence of the definition of employee in § 630(f) does extend the definition to include some workers overseas, it is expressly limited to "citizen [ designed to close a "loophole" that enabled American companies to transfer workers to subsidiaries overseas and then discriminate against them on the basis of age 121 that the statute was extended to protect U.S. citizens employed by a U.S. company or a foreign company controlled by a domestic entity.
122
The Morelli court reasoned that because the 1984 amendments established that the ADEA does not apply to the foreign operations of a foreign company, the foreign employees of those companies should not be counted for jurisdictional purposes. 123 The court pointed to the new language of § 623(h):
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is in a foreign country, any practice by such corporation prohibited under this section shall be presumed to be such practice by such employer.
(2) The prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer. 
C. The Second Circuit Veers Off-Course
Like the district court before it, the Second Circuit began its analysis with an acknowledgment of the undisputed fact that Cedel was "a foreign employer with fewer than 20 employees in its sole U.S. branch." 130 However, the similarities to the lower court's analysis ended as quickly as they began.
The court next turned to the portion of the ADEA that Congress added in 1984. As discussed in part IIIA, Congress added § 2(h)(2) in direct response to the courts' decisions that "the ADEA did not apply to 'Americans employed outside the United States by American employers.'" 131 Through this amendment, the statute now provides "[t]he prohibitions of this section shall 132. 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (2000). The subsection was originally codified at § 623(g), but there was already a subsection (g). The mistake was corrected in a 1986 amendment.
133 The Second Circuit recognized and dismissed the idea that this new subsection "might suggest that the ADEA . . . does not apply to the domestic operations of foreign employers."
133 Instead, the court explained the "plain language . . . is not necessarily decisive if it is inconsistent with Congress' clearly expressed legislative purpose," 134 and that the context of the 1984 amendment "reveals that Congress' purpose was not to exempt the domestic workplaces of foreign employers from the ADEA's prohibition [s] ." 135 Rather, the court reasoned, the purpose of this provision "was to limit the reach of an extraterritorial amendment adopted as part of the same legislation."
136
The extraterritorial amendment referenced by the Second Circuit contained three parts. The first part modified the definition of employee 137 to include "any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country." 138 In other words, the extraterritorial amendment provided ADEA coverage to Americans working overseas for companies meeting the ADEA definition of employer. This definitional amendment was, the court noted, coupled with an expansion of the statute to impute liability on a U.S. parent corporation for the discriminatory actions of a foreign subsidiary corporation it controls. This second part of the amendment provided that "[i]f an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is in a foreign country, any practice by such corporation prohibited under this section shall be presumed to be such practice by such employer."
139 Finally, as the Second Circuit points out, in addition to expanding the scope of the statute in the first two parts to the 1984 extraterritorial amendment, Congress also limited the impact of the amendments through a "foreign law exception. intended to "conform the ADEA's reach to 'the well-established principle of sovereignty, that no nation has the right to impose its labor standards on another country.'" 141 Analyzing these three parts together, the Second Circuit rationalized that " [t] here is no evidence in the legislative history that these amendments were intended to restrict the application of the ADEA with respect to domestic operations of foreign employers."
142
The Second Circuit further opined that the ADEA's statutory cousins, namely Title VII and the ADA, expressly limit their exclusions to the "foreign operations of an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer."
143
As there is no legislative history for these provisions 144 evidencing Congress's intention to create any such difference in scope between the ADEA and Title VII or the ADA, "[i]t is not apparent why the domestic operations of foreign companies should be subject to Title VII and the ADA, but not to the ADEA."
145 Such an exemption, the Second Circuit concluded, would undercut the very purpose of the ADEA to promote the employment of older persons.
146
Leaving aside the fact that these provisions presume the foreign company is already an "employer" for jurisdictional purposes, in other words, the court concluded that because the plain language of the ADEA's sister statutes only excluded the overseas operations of non-U.S. controlled foreign businesses, the ADEA, which does not contain any similar language, should be read to provide identical coverage.
The Second Circuit next turned to the question of whether overseas employees can be counted in determining whether a foreign employer is subject to the ADEA through the counting of overseas workers. 147 After concluding that, as originally drafted, the broad language in the definition of "employee" does not apply to restrict the scope of coverage but merely 148 provides a numerical minimum, the court analyzed the ADEA following the 1984 amendments.
148
In the Second Circuit's view, the 1984 amendment supplements the definition of employee to include U.S. citizens employed overseas by an employer. 149 The court reasoned that "[t]his revision . . . does not establish that the employees, wherever located, of a foreign corporation with a U.S. branch are not 'employees' under the ADEA" because the statute does not make a distinction between domestic and foreign employers. 150 Further, the court reasons, the § 623(h)(2) exclusion of ADEA protections for an individual working overseas for an employer that is foreign and not controlled by an American employer does not provide support for only counting domestic employees; § 623(h)(2) was only intended to limit liability with respect to those foreign workers. 151 Consequently, "if Congress had wished to restrict the definition of 'employee' to exclude a foreign employer's foreign workers, it certainly could have done so directly when it amended [the definition of employee] in 1984." 152 In essence, while Congress was amending the ADEA to provide protections for Americans working overseas, Congress could also have limited the definition of employee to specifically exclude a foreign employer's workers. But because Congress did not, the court rationalized, the 1984 extraterritorial amendments supplement the definition of employer rather than restrict it.
The court concluded that merely because the overseas employees of a foreign employer are not protected by the ADEA does not mean that they should not be counted. 153 After all, the court reasoned, the ADEA counts employees under age forty even though they do not receive the protections of the statute.
154
So because neither the original ADEA nor the 1984 extraterritorial amendments exclude the counting of foreign workers employed overseas, the counting of those foreign workers must be permitted, making Cedel an employer under the ADEA even though it employed only eleven in its U.S. operations. 
IV. ANATOMY OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S FLANKING MANEUVER
How did the Second Circuit find statutory authorization permitting a broad interpretation of the coverage of the ADEA when every court that had addressed similar issues merely found limitations? A careful reading of the Second Circuit's opinion in Morelli demonstrates the court's unwillingness to be faithful to congressional intent despite a stated intention to do so. Students of the various theories of statutory construction will recognize that the Second Circuit claims to be ascribing to an intentionalist approach, yet it employs a hodge-podge of approaches-mostly dynamic-to arrive at its desired result. A result, in this instance, through which the Second Circuit clearly supplants its will for that of Congress.
While most readers will be familiar with the basic canons of statutory interpretation, a brief review of some of the major precepts is appropriate. The purpose of this Article remains, however, not to propose a theory of statutory interpretation or even to explore the many theories that exist. Rather, we explicate the flaws in the Second Circuit's reasoning under the model it claims to use in reaching its decision in Morelli. In analyzing the court's rationale we do not decide what an employee is under the ADEA. In other words, we do not seek to determine, in the oft-used jurisprudential example, what constitutes a vehicle when applying a park ordinance prohibiting the use of vehicles, 155 but, rather, demonstrate that the statute-the ADEA-was not even intended to apply to this park, i.e., foreign workers employed by foreign businesses.
A. Three Interpretive Theories: An Analytical Framework for Statutory Interpretation
A statute generally is considered to be "the written will of the legislature expressed according to the form necessary to constitute it a law of the state, and rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities." , that executive branch regulations should be granted substantial deference when not contrary to the statutory scheme). In reviewing the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the Clear Air Act, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, as a threshold matter, courts must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress, but that if a statute does not unambiguously express Congress's intent then such courts must give deference to an agency's permissible construction of the Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, known as the bicameralism and presentment clause, provides the forms and solemnities necessary for the Congress to impose its will by enacting such statutes.
157
The statutory will of Congress is neither self-enforcing nor selfinterpreting-our Constitutional Republic is comprised of three equal branches of government expected to impose checks and balances on one another. The judicial branch is to interpret congressional will, 158 and the executive branch is to enforce congressional will as interpreted by the judiciary.
The evolution of the modern regulatory bureaucracy complicates the delicate balance of power conceived by the founders and accentuates the critical importance of statutory interpretation and application. 159 To maintain the regulatory state, Congress enacts statutes with ever increasing frequency. As this abundance of statutory law has grown, the law has become more detailed in its prescriptions. 160 Too often, Congress directs its will, not to the citizenry, but an executive bureaucracy, 161 which by design was intended to apply the law, not create it.
Indeed, "the legitimacy and operation" of congressional will sometimes rest with the department, agency, bureau, commission, or official whose job it is to enforce the statute. 162 These executive branch delegates, or regulatory communities, have been given considerable deference in their interpretations of the statutes they are charged with enforcing. unaccountable to the citizenry and operate unchecked, executing personal or institutional interpretations of a given statute upon members of the public without the resources or stamina to resist. Accordingly, the judiciary must increase its vigilance in conducting statutory interpretations 164 to prevent further erosion of congressional will by the executive branch. Of course the judiciary must also be disciplined so as not to supplant its own will for that of the legislature. As Alexander Hamilton admonished in Federalist No. 78, "[t]he courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."
165
Academics and jurists who ascribe to the school of "dynamic statutory construction" refuse to heed Hamilton's admonishment. This crowd eschews "original intent" and "plain meaning" approaches to statutory construction, and describes the underlying precepts of such intentionalist approaches as a "dubious description of practical reality, and a dreary aspiration for our polity." 166 Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation adhere to the belief that one cannot interpret the meaning of a statute as not fixed until it is applied to concrete circumstances and that the meaning is neither uncommon nor illegitimate for the meaning of a provision to change over time. 167 By contrast, the intentionalist approaches emphasize legislative intent as the goal of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, the executive and judicial branches, as well as the citizenry, should apply legislative directives in a manner consistent 168 . ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETATION, supra note 165, at 214 n.7. with the legislature's expectations and intent when enacting a particular statute. 168 The third grouping of interpretative theories, known as textualist theories, seek to apply the "plain meaning" of statutory text either as the best evidence of legislative intent or as the only authoritative basis for interpretation. One version of textualism, known as the "new textualism," has been ascribed to by Justice Scalia in several of his judicial opinions and in the Tanner Lectures at Princeton University. 169 The new textualism "holds that the only object of statutory interpretation is to determine the meaning of the text and that the only legitimate sources for this inquiry are text-based or text-linked sources."
170 According to Justice Scalia, this method is most consistent with the rule of law and the separation of judicial and legislative powers.
171
Courts often times use an amalgamation of interpretive theories. For its part, the United States Supreme Court almost invariably purports to begin any interpretive process with the statutory text. 172 The Justices have employed varying interpretive analyses, however, ranging from text-oriented approaches to approaches willing to subsume the statutory text, and, at times, to ignore it in furtherance of a results-oriented approach.
173 Sometimes the statutory text is the beginning and the end of the interpretive process; at other times it is merely the beginning of the process; and still at other times, the text is simply not part of the process.
In Morelli, the Second Circuit ignored the statutory text of the ADEA and employed a dynamic interpretive methodology-under the intellectually dishonest guise of an intentionalist approach-to conclude that the congressional purpose of protecting older employees from discrimination would be furthered if the will of Congress, as expressed clearly in the text of the statute, were ignored.
B. The Second Circuit's Strained Reasoning
The Second Circuit's plain language analysis as applied in Morelli is flawed. "A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."
174 Consequently, the 1984 amendments, particularly § 4(h)(2)-which specifies that the "prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer" 175 -should be given its plain language meaning; all foreign firms are exempt from the ADEA unless controlled by an American corporation. Even the Second Circuit in Morelli acknowledges that "[a]n absolutely literal reading of § 4(h)(2) might suggest that the ADEA also does not apply to the domestic operations of foreign employers." 176 In stating so, the Second Circuit implicitly admits that the text of the ADEA is clear enough, yet reaches for the legislative history not to clarify, but to obfuscate.
177
The Second Circuit chose to ignore the express will of Congress and offered the excuse that statutory language is "not necessarily decisive if it is inconsistent with Congress' clearly expressed legislative purpose."
178 The Second Circuit contends that the purpose of § 4(h)(2) was not to create an exemption for foreign employers within the United States, but to limit the reach of the concurrent extraterritorial expansion. There is some case law to support this position. However, the so-called "clearly expressed legislative purpose" propounded by the Second Circuit does not support a conclusion that Congress intended the ADEA to require the counting of foreign workers employed overseas by foreign-controlled businesses. The House Report concerning the 1984 amendment clearly proclaims that "the amendment is carefully worded to apply only to citizens of the United States who are working for U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries."
180 Yet the Second Circuit relies on this "carefully worded" text to reach the negative inference that because Congress did not choose to exclude a foreign employer's foreign workers, it is appropriate to count them to reach the statutory minimum.
181 By that rational, the ADEA mandated the counting of foreign workers even before the statute was amended, a conclusion in conflict with the decisions of every court that had addressed the matter before the Second Circuit did so in Morelli.
182
One circuit court has determined that when analyzing a remedial statute such as the ADEA, "[a] procedural requirement of the Act, of doubtful meaning in a given case, should not be interpreted to deny an employee a claim for relief unless to do so would clearly further some substantial goal of the Act." 183 The statutory minimum, however, which is designed to protect small employers, is far from a mere procedural requirement. The floor debate over the ADEA's analogous statute, Title VII, as described in Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 184 indicates that the costs associated with defending against discrimination claims was a factor in the decision to implement a minimum employee requirement.
185
Of course, this rationale further suggests that Congress might not have intended the Act to govern foreign employers operating small domestic offices.
The Second Circuit's holding, taken to its logical conclusion, could easily result in the ADEA's application to a foreign company with just one U.S. employee and nineteen world-wide employees. Certainly, such a situation would create precisely the burden Congress had intended to avoid by establishing a twenty employee jurisdictional minimum.
C. Equal Standards or Unequal Burdens?
In addition to protecting small businesses from the "costs" of compliance, "Congress based its twenty-employee minimum on 'the practical consideration that a larger employer with more varied jobs could more constructively utilize an older worker's skills. '" 186 When a foreign employer has fewer than twenty employees working within the United States, there is no variety of jobs in which the employer can utilize the employee's skills. In the example of the not unlikely outgrowth of the Second Circuit's Morelli holding raised above, where there exists only one worker employed domestically, in order to "utilize" the employee's skills the employer will be forced to transfer the individual overseas. This is problematic. Skills, language, abilities, and the like do not necessarily translate to cross-border employment, yet liability remains.
Furthermore, enforcement of the ADEA against the foreign firm with a very small domestic office is likely to result in greater harm to the domestic employee than if the ADEA did not provide protections at all. Foreign employers will know that their overseas operations are expressly excluded from coverage under the Act. As a result, the foreign employer can transfer its domestic employees to an overseas office merely for the pretext of termination or other discriminatory practice. The American citizen who could have been let go within the United States and possibly sought a remedy through state anti-discrimination laws which usually have significantly lower statutory minimums will be discriminated upon, terminated, and stranded in a foreign country without remedy.
The 1984 amendment closed the loophole in the ADEA that enabled domestic firms to engage in this practice. Matters of international comity will, however, always restrict Congress from closing the loophole enabling foreign employers to engage in this shell-game. Congress certainly could not have intended to provide an end-run around compliance with the ADEA, but the Morelli court's holding does just that and in a manner bound to realize even greater harm to the very citizens the statute was intended to protect. 
D. The Role of the EEOC
In Morelli, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the EEOC guidelines were persuasive in their determination that the ADEA applies to the domestic operations of foreign firms.
187
"It is well-established that the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great deference."
188 As noted by the Second Circuit in Yerdon v. Henry, 189 however, the EEOC does not necessarily have deferential authority to issue rules or regulations.
190 "Thus, the weight accorded a particular EEOC guideline or interpretation . . . depends upon the 'thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.'" Instead, the Third Circuit determined that the question of whether or not the ADEA applied extraterritorially "is a matter of pure statutory construction, and agency expertise is not controlling."
194 Nevertheless, even giving due regard to the EEOC's guidelines, the Commission's interpretation lacks significant support earning little, if any, weight.
In determining that the ADEA governs the actions of a foreign firm operating in the United States, the EEOC merely asserts that the employer is "subject to the Act" because "a foreign employer enjoys the benefits and protections of United States Law when employing individuals in the United States." 195 This conclusion completely lacks any analysis. The guidelines acknowledge the 1984 amendment to § 4(h), which specifies "[t]he prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer," 196 but they address the apparent plain language which suggests that the statute does not extend to any foreign firm unless that firm is controlled by an American company. While it is generally true that compliance with domestic laws merely constitutes a cost of conducting business within the United States, Congress's selection of this specific language certainly must be provided greater weight than an unsubstantiated conclusion by a self interested bureaucracy seeking to expand its reach.
" [T] he doctrine of expressio unis est exclusio alterius instructs that where a law expressly describes a particular situation to which it shall apply, what was omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded." 197 As the Supreme Court recognized, "[t]he expressed purpose" of the 1984 ADEA amendments "was to 'make provisions of the Act apply to citizens of the United States employed in foreign countries by U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries. '" 198 Even the EEOC acknowledges that "Congress amended the ADEA because it wanted to ensure that the citizens of the United States who are employed overseas by American Firms or their subsidiaries enjoy similar protections as citizens and aliens employed in the United States." 199 Clearly an amendment which was enacted to address a specific issue and drafted in specific language should not be subject to expansion through the interpretation of a mere governmental agency and in contravention of the canons of statutory interpretation. coverage and will act whenever it becomes necessary to clarify its true intent. This process is how the framers intended the divided branches of our Constitutional Republic to operate, and Congress's reticence in this instance does not justify the judiciary's legislation-making actions, as seen in Morelli.
The unstated motive underlying results-oriented decisions like Morelli appear to be the inclusion of putative employment discrimination victims within the protections of the various federal employment discrimination statutes-that is, preventing them from falling into the "black hole" of noncoverage. But the result is more akin to Alice's journey down the rabbit hole with a "Queen of Hearts" judiciary, rather than the politically accountable legislative process.
In its zeal to cast a safety net over this perceived deficiency of the ADEA, the Morelli court ignored the fact that one of the causes of action asserted by Ms. Morelli was a claim that Cedel violated the New York Human Rights Act. 209 Most employing entities in the United States will, to a certain degree, find themselves subject to one or more of the various state or local employment discrimination statutes and ordinances. Calls for protecting putative victims of invidious employment discrimination employed by small domestic outposts of foreign employers do not go unheeded in the absence of ADEA coverage; all but the smallest of employing entities are covered by state statutes and local ordinances oftentimes paralleling the protections of their federal counterparts.
Rather than allow the genius of our federal system to operate as intended, courts, such as the Morelli court, ignore the plain text of the applicable statute and contort well-reasoned principles of statutory construction to prevent a result perceived by it as distasteful. In doing so, such courts usurp the role of Congress and create more problems than they solve-all the reason why such decisions are best left to Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's well-intentioned, albeit flawed, decision in Morelli poses broad implications for the global enforcement of American employment discrimination laws. Indeed, every significant shift in the application of the ADA, the ADEA, or Title VII potentially herald a change in the collective jurisprudence of all three statutes. 210 In that regard, Morelli has and will continue to serve as a springboard for the continued internationalization of American employment discrimination statutes. 211 As a direct consequence, the overseas operations of foreign enterprises may become subjected to the investigative reach of the EEOC, and furthermore, these foreign enterprises are likely to be reluctant to invest in America and to employ our workers here at home-partly because the Second Circuit supplanted its will for that of Congress.
Morelli's internationalization of the ADEA not only subjects to possible liability a larger subset of employing entities than Congress truly intended, but this decision also provides the EEOC with a platform to extend its investigative tentacles around a larger subset of small businesses otherwise too small to be considered "employers" but for their foreign-controlled parent enterprises and the foreign workers employed on foreign soil. It is reasonable to presume, for instance, that Morelli may actually allow the EEOC's New York District Office to issue administrative subpoenas to executives of a European or Asian entity that owns or controls a small domestic subsidiary and that a federal judge in the Southern District of New York will enforce them. Suddenly, the EEOC may become the world's "equal employment opportunity" enforcer, regardless of whether or not the world-or Congress-wants it to be.
The EEOC, never in need of a reason to extend itself, will likely exploit decisions like Morelli to further advance its self-expanding mission on to the global stage despite the dearth of statutory authority to do so. 212 213. Trumpeting its self-proclaimed achievements through such matters as headline-grabbing settlement amounts, the EEOC leaves the distinct impression that success can only be measured by cases won and settlements obtained-the exact opposite of how rational people typically assess the successful implementation of a remedial measure-that is, by determining whether the remedial measure has truly caused a decrease in the frequency of the problem the remedial measure was designed to remediate-invidious discrimination here. Yet the EEOC's self-promoting scorecard seems to suggest that such invidious discrimination has gotten worse, not better, since 1964, despite a much more inclusive and diverse American workforce today than in the infancy of the civil rights movement.
214. That is not to suggest that the EEOC's zealousness rises to the level of the IRS agents who terrorized tax-law transgressors. See Robert Dodge, Commissioner Apologizes for Abuses at IRS; He Vows Immediate Reforms, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 1997, at 1A (reporting of a Senate hearing in which IRS employees told of agents "tampering with jurors and witnesses, fabricating evidence and browsing through agency records to learn secrets about former husbands, potential boyfriends and enemies"). The EEOC's targets, discriminating businesses, are of course inherently less frail than the individual taxpayer, but analogies are far from unreasonable.
215. In August 2002, the EEOC issued a press release announcing the completion of an "extensive five-year litigation study" reporting that nearly 91% of all federal employment discrimination lawsuits asserted by the EEOC are resolved in its favor-either through Consent Decrees, settlement agreements or court orders. Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, EEOC Issues Comprehensive Litigation Report (Aug. 13, 2002) (reporting success rate of 90.72%), available at http://www.eeoc. gov/press/8-13-02.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004) [hereinafter EEOC Litigation Report]. At trial and on inherent need to validate its own existence, 213 the EEOC has justified budget requests-and its own existence-by touting its enforcement efforts, 214 i.e., through its litigation statistics 215 and the press release "bully pulpit." 216 These appeal, the EEOC's success rates are 60.24% and 80% respectively. Id. These numbers dwarf the private bar's success rate of only 26.8% at trial and a meager 16% on appeal. Id. Remarkable as these numbers are, they are even more so when one considers that the EEOC has achieved these results while increasing the number of suits they have brought. . In 2002 alone, the EEOC's Office of General Counsel, the litigation arm of the EEOC, recovered over $26.6 million for persons who filed federal discrimination claims. EEOC Litigation Report, supra. As Cari M. Dominguez, Chair of the EEOC, announced, the EEOC "will not hesitate to utilize litigation when necessary and appropriate." Id. Unanswered is the question of how the EEOC has managed to achieve these victories during a period where critics suggest that the EEOC has been avoiding the largest defendants and the most political cases. Reed Abelson, Anti-Bias Agency is Short of Will and Cash, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2001, at 3-1 ("Although it does manage to process the tens of thousands of complaints it receives each year, the agency seems passive . . . . Its enforcement efforts often seem haphazard and uncoordinated, critics say, and it is noticeably absent in many lawsuits accusing the nation's most powerful companies . . . ."). Prosecutorial discretion certainly is one major factor, but to leave the matter at that minimizes the agency's slow but inexorable mission creep as an additional explanation.
216. See, e.g., EEOC Litigation Report, supra note 215 (describing results of EEOC litigation study). Further leaving the impression that dollars equals victories as the EEOC's own press releases posted on its website where, between October 2002 and October 2003, the EEOC posted thirty-seven press releases with titles containing settlement amounts or judgment awards ranging from $30,000 to $47 million. U.S. EEOC, EEOC Press Releases, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2004 217 With this nearly 30% increase over a five-year period, the EEOC obtained a budget totaling over $310 million in 2002. 218 The internationalization of American employment discrimination laws will likely be too tempting for the EEOC to pass up. If the EEOC does indeed use Morelli to investigate foreign owned enterprises on foreign soil, it will likely ruffle international feathers at a time when anti-U.S. sentiment appears to be at an all-time high. The legitimacy of the EEOC's potential jurisdictional reach into these murky international waters pushes, if not exceeds, the bounds of its legitimate authority as currently established by Congress.
Moreover, Morelli's internationalization of American employment discrimination statutes does not bode well for the U.S. economy. Wary of being scrutinized by the American regulatory community and of being exposed to legal liability, foreign business enterprises are dissuaded from investing in the United States in a way that would actually employ more Americans. For instance, remedies under the various employment discrimination statutes include injunctive relief, back pay, front pay, Cedel, the foreign employees of the defendant should be counted to determine the punitive damages cap under Title VII). The Greenbaum court subsequently found that the previous punitive damage award of $50,000, which had been based on number of employees the defendant had in the United States, should be increased to $300,000 reflecting the total number of employees defendant had world-wide. compensatory damages and punitive damages; and post-Morelli, the number of employees employed overseas by a foreign parent enterprise can affect the amount of liability to which such businesses, both foreign and domestic, are exposed.
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Concern for such uncertain legal exposure unquestionably impacts a foreign firm's willingness to invest in U.S. enterprises in a manner that would result in domestic job creation. Between 1997 and 2000, direct foreign investment in the United States increased from $70 billion to $320 billion. 220 That rapid increase in investment dollars was, however, almost exclusively a result of foreign acquisition of U.S. businesses, as opposed to establishment of new businesses in the United States. 221 According to Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) figures, while the foreign acquisition of U.S. businesses increased from $60 billion to $316 billion over the four year period from 1997 to 2000, foreign investment to establish new domestic businesses actually decreased from nearly $9 billion to $4.3 billion. 222 While the actual cause of this drop may never be known, the decrease does coincide with the Second Circuit's ruling in Morelli. Accordingly, Morelli could very likely have a deleterious effect on foreign investment in the American economy and may actually preclude the creation of new employment opportunities for Americans of every race, sex, age, etc.-that is, equal unemployment opportunities.
Given the constitutional, economic, and geopolitical implications involved, the decision to internationalize American employment discrimination statutes is certainly one better left to Congress.
